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Do immigrants have a higher demand for large denominated banknotes than
natives? This micro study examines whether banknote orders for CHF 1,000
notes, a banknote used for storage purposes, is concentrated in Swiss mu-
nicipalities with a high foreign-to-native ratio. The evidence for 251 Swiss
municipalities ﬁnds that immigrants hoard fewer CHF 1,000 banknotes than
natives. This result means that immigration reduces seigniorage (per person)
as measured by banknote orders. A 1% increase in the immigrant-to-native
ratio is coincident with a reduction in banknote orders by CHF 4,000. This
reduction is attributed to wealth and age eﬀects linked to immigrants.
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1. Introduction
The inability to track banknotes in circulation complicates the estimation
of regional money demand functions. This estimation hurdle is even more
pronounced for the world’s largest banknote, the CHF 1,000 note.1 It is rarely
used in daily transactions, yet the currency volume of CHF 22.4 billion for
the CHF 1,000 note means that the average Swiss resident holds at least
three of them (Swiss population was 7.4 million in 2007). Of these residents,
a large percentage are foreigners (22.1% of the Swiss resident population
in 2007). Their residencies and those of natives are well known as are the
banknotes’ delivery destinations. With this information, I ask: what can the
traits of municipalities with a high share of immigrants, hereafter immigrant
municipalities, tell us about the demand for large banknotes?
This empirical analysis investigates the impact of immigration on large
banknotes across 251 Swiss municipalities. A priori, the correlation between
immigration and large banknotes is unclear. A positive correlation may re-
ﬂect a low level of ﬁnancial participation in banking services or immigrant
preferences to send home remittances. Alternatively, a negative correlation
1The EUR 500 note is the second largest banknote in nominal value. Historically, the
CHF/EUR exchange rate has hovered around 1.5, yielding 666 euros.3
may capture tax avoidance (Boeschoten and Fase, 1992) or particular traits
(e.g., lower average age or lower wealth than natives) that enter a traditional
model of precautionary money demand.
The study contributes to the vast literature on money demand by touch-
ing on the domains of immigration and monetary policy. It is the ﬁrst to
estimate a currency demand speciﬁcation at the regional level. Previous
studies on regional money demand have used bank deposits as a measure of
narrow money.2 I overcome this data problem for regional cash holdings by
using banknote orders at the bank-branch level. A further contribution is to
identify immigration’s impact in money demand. A contentious issue in many
micro studies on immigration and prices is the separation between demand
and supply eﬀects, see Lach (2007), Cortes (2008), and Frattini (2008). This
identiﬁcation issue is simpliﬁed, because banknote orders are strictly demand
oriented.
2Recent micro studies include Bover and Watson (2007), Fischer (2007), Fujiki (2002).
See also the earlier studeis by Fujiki and Mulligan (1996), Mulligan (1997), and Mulligan
and Sala-i-Martin (1992). In a related study, Jankowski et al. (2007) match banknote
orders with Hispanic immigrant concentration for the Chicago area using census data
from 2000. It is unclear, however, whether their cross-section estimates are valid at the
state or national level.4
The results show that large banknote hoarding is less prevalent in im-
migrant municipalities. A 1% increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio is
coincident with a reduction of CHF 4,000. This result means that immigra-
tion reduces seigniorage-per-capita as measured by banknote orders. This
reduction in banknote orders, which is consistent with the precautionary de-
mand hypothesis, is attributed to two factors. First, immigrant wealth is
lower than native wealth. Second, traits linked to immigrants (e.g., lower
age) also account for the low demand for large banknotes.
The paper begins in Section 2 by presenting four hypotheses linking im-
migration and large banknotes. Section 3 then lays out the empirical frame-
work together with the data. Thereafter, Section 4 presents the main results
with robustness checks. Section 5 oﬀers conclusions on the importance of
immigrant traits for money demand estimation at the regional level.
2. Four hypotheses linking immigration and large banknotes
Of the four hypotheses that link large banknote hoarding to immigrants, the
ﬁrst two - on precautionary money demand and tax avoidance - predict that
immigrants hold fewer large denominated banknotes than natives. While less
germane for Switzerland, the third and fourth hypotheses - on remittances5
and lack of ﬁnancial participation - predict that immigrants hold larger ban-
knotes.3
The most popular hypothesis is the precautionary demand for money. In
the microfoundations literature developed by Whalen (1966), Miller and Orr
(1966), and Frenkel and Jovanovic (1988), the real quantity of money bal-
ances demanded for transactions and precautionary purposes is a function
of several factors: real income, the variance of real income, the rate of inter-
est on an alternative asset, and a set of demographic variables. Aside from
income diﬀerences between regions, immigration captures important socio-
demographic traits such as age and education.4 Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
3Because it largely believed that Swiss banknotes do not leave the national borders,
the hypothesis of currency substitution is not considered, see Porter and Judon, (1996)
for the United States and Maradan (2007) for Switzerland. This observation is conﬁrmed
by the UK’s recent ban on handling EUR 500 notes. Since May 15, 2010, British banks
and currency exchanges have been banned from importing EUR 500 notes because of fears
of organized crime. The UK ban does not apply to CHF 1,000 notes because there is no
widespread evidence of its use. Another hypothesis that is advanced but does not apply
to Switzerland is the link between large banknotes and the informal sector (see Rogoﬀ,
1998). Schneider (2008), for example, ﬁnds that the Swiss informal sector is smaller than
8%, which is low by international standards.
4Although many European countries have good regional data on immigration ﬂows,6
(1996) argue that the cost of adopting ﬁnancial technologies is positively
related to age (opportunity costs) and negatively related to the level of ed-
ucation.5 Adoption, or not, of new ﬁnancial technologies available in a new
country is a decision that confronts immigrants.
Immigrants in Switzerland are diﬀerent from natives. First, on average,
they are younger than natives. The share of immigrant workers below the
age of 40 was 56% in 2006, whereas for Swiss workers it was 44% according
to the Swiss Bureau for Statistics (BfS) (2008).6 This lower average age
additional demographic information is often diﬃcult to obtain. Hence, in a precautionary
money demand function, the immigrant-to-native ratio may serve as a simple proxy for
omitted variables. Crucial is that average immigrant traits diﬀer from average native
traits.
5Tin (2008), for example, using information from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation, estimates a precautionary money demand function for U.S. households that
includes family traits. He ﬁnds that age and education correlates positively with non-
interest earning checking accounts. Similarly, Duca and Whitesell (1995) show that age
correlates positively with the demand for credit cards.
6Information from the most recent 2000 census shows that the average age of Swiss
residents is 39.3 for natives versus 33.7 for immigrants. The average age diﬀerences are
even larger for large municipalities (i.e., population greater than 10,000): 42.8 for natives
versus 32.7 for immigrants. These results show that average age of immigrants is evenly
distributed across municipalities, whereas the average age of natives is heavily skewed7
should yield a negative correlation between immigrant municipalities and
large banknotes. Second, their average educational level is lower than that of
natives. Table 1 shows the absolute numbers and their percentages for three
education categories: high school certiﬁcate, apprenticeship, and university
degree. A striking feature is the high percentage of immigrants with only
a high school degree (32%) compared to the Swiss (13%) in 2006.7 The
demographic trait of low immigrant education should result in low adoption
rates of new ﬁnancial technologies. Thus, a positive correlation between
immigrant municipalities and large banknotes is predicted.
A second hypothesis for holding large banknotes is tax avoidance (see
Boeschoten and Fase, 1992 and Maradan, 2007). The Swiss wealth tax is
annual and is levied at the cantonal level.8 The basis of assessment is as
follows: residents pay an annual wealth tax on the value of all assets located
toward larger cities.
7The level of education is not uniform across immigrant groups. This feature will be
tested in the empirical section.
8Several other European countries impose a wealth tax. They include France, the
Netherlands, Norway, Greece, and Liechtenstein. This tax was recently lifted in Austria
(1997), Finland (2006), Germany (1997), Iceland (2006), Luxembourg (2006), Sweden
(2007), and Spain (2008). Countries without a wealth tax include Belgium, Italy, Portugal,
and the United Kingdom.8
in Switzerland. The progressive wealth tax varies slightly between cantons
with a maximum of around 1.5% levied on net assets. Individuals whose
wealth is below CHF 250,000 are exempted from the tax.
Large banknote holdings are a simple means for avoiding the wealth tax
and should yield a distinct seasonal pattern. Because this tax is based on the
end-of-year ﬁnancial position, large banknote holdings should increase before
year’s end to reduce the wealth stated on ﬁnancial statements. However in
the new year, large banknote holdings should fall to reap interest income.
Thus at the quarterly frequency, a rise in the fourth quarter in year t and a
fall in the ﬁrst quarter of year t + 1 is expected for large banknotes.
In the aggregate, the seasonal pattern of tax evasion should behave simi-
larly to a Christmas shopping eﬀect but more strongly because of the larger
wealth eﬀect. Figure 1 shows the seasonal pattern of notes in circulation for
transaction purposes (i.e., CHF 10, 20, 50, and 100 notes added together)
and for storage purposes (i.e., CHF 1,000 note) from 1980:1 to 2009:12. The
graph shows indirect evidence consistent with the tax evasion argument: the
seasonal pattern for the CHF 1,000 note is larger than the combined Christ-
mas eﬀect stemming from the aggregated notes for transaction purposes. The
values are normalized at 1980:1. Because the CHF 1,000 note is not readily9
available at all ATM machines and is not accepted in all stores, the marked
seasonal pattern in Figure 1 is attributed to other non shopping domestic
activities: tax evasion (i.e., CHF 1,000 notes dispersed regionally) or bank
window dressing (i.e., CHF 1,000 notes concentrated in cities of major bank
headquarters).9
The wealth tax’s deduction means that the less wealthy, which includes
immigrants, have a lower incentive to evade (or are not aﬀected by) the tax.
While there is no direct comparative information on immigrant and native
wealth in Switzerland, several indicators suggest that average native wealth is
higher. One measure is salary and employment. Immigrants in Switzerland
on average earn less and are more likely to be unemployed than natives.
According to the BfS (2008), the median monthly salary for immigrants
was just over CHF 5,000 in 2006, while for natives it was just under 6,000.
Similarly, the unemployment rate for immigrants was 7.1% in 2006, while
the rate for natives was only 2.6%. A further measure of wealth is home
ownership. Again according to the BfS (2008), native home ownership stood
9The rise in the volume of the CHF 1,000 notes relative to the other notes starting in
1997 is partially explained by the introduction of the CHF 200 note, which replaced the
CHF 500 note in the same year. The newly introduced note is used both for transaction
and storage purposes, while the CHF 500 banknote is used primarily for storage.10
at 52.7% in 2007:Q2, whereas immigrant home ownership was just 18.6%.
The incentive to avoid wealth taxes on the part of wealthier natives means
that a negative (seasonal) correlation between immigrant municipalities and
large denominated notes is expected.
The third hypothesis is based on remittances. Jankowski et al. (2007)
argue that remittances operating through global cash transfer services are at-
tractive for immigrant groups that send cash to recipient countries with weak
ﬁnancial infrastructure. Although the practice of remittances is widespread
in the United States and Saudi Arabia, several factors speak against this
argument as a plausible explanation of large banknote holdings among im-
migrants in Switzerland.
One counterargument is the small size of remittances to poor countries.
Arapovic and Brown (2009) estimate the total amount of remittances to the
Balkans and Turkey; the most likely immigrant groups to use cash transfer
services. The estimated sum is only CHF 0.7 billion for 404,000 immigrants
in 2006. This total yields CHF 1,700 per immigrant: an amount well below
the average holdings of three CHF 1,000 notes per person. A further coun-
terargument is that immigrants from the Balkans and Turkey comprise only
25% of the immigrant population living in Switzerland. It is thus unlikely11
that these two immigrant groups at the municipality level can inﬂuence the
demand for large banknotes in the aggregate.
The fourth hypothesis is ﬁnancial participation. This hypothesis is again
motivated by the U.S. experience. Jankowski et al. (2007) show empiri-
cally for the Chicago area that Hispanics, in contrast to other immigrant
groups, hoard USD 100 notes. The conjecture advanced by the authors is
that Hispanics hardly use banking services. Frictions in these services for
Hispanic immigrants include lack of a common language, lack of residence
documentation, and salary payments by cash or check.
The “unbanked” hypothesis does not readily apply to immigrants in
Switzerland. Independent of their skill-level or language skills, employees
in Switzerland need a bank account to receive their salary. Almost all salary
payments in Switzerland are electronic transfers.
3. Econometric speciﬁcation and data
This section ﬁrst presents the empirical model together with the instrumenta-
tion strategy. Empirical estimates from the ﬁrst-stage regression are shown.
In a second subsection, the data are discussed.12
3.1 Empirical speciﬁcation
The econometric model estimates the demand eﬀect of immigrants to natives
of a Swiss municipality on banknote orders in the same city. Banknote or-
ders are volume measures in Swiss francs for six banknotes: CHF 10, CHF
20, CHF 50, CHF 100, CHF 200, and CHF 1,000. The following speciﬁ-
cation adapted from Lach (2007) and Frattini (2008) deﬁnes the banknote
order, BOmt, for municipality, m,( m =1 ,···, 251) for time, t, covering the
quarterly sample from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4 (deﬁned by data availability) as
lnBOmt = μt + μm + δ(Imt/Nmt)+βln(Imt + Nmt)+λXmt + umt, (1)
where Imt and Nmt are the number of immigrants and natives in municipality,
m, in quarter, t, μ s are time and municipality eﬀects, Xmt are additional
municipality speciﬁc factors (i.e., the unemployment rate serves as a proxy for
economic activity or overnight stays capturing tourism eﬀects), and umt is a
shock to banknote orders in quarter t. Total population, (Imt + Nmt), which
captures size eﬀects, should be positively correlated with banknote orders.
The size eﬀect of diﬀerent notes may be nonlinear because the distribution
of ATM services is greater in larger cities.10
10See Lach (2007) for a discussion of nonlinear eﬀects for population in a similar speci-
ﬁcation for CPI prices.13
The coeﬃcient of interest in equation (1) is δ. An insigniﬁcant coeﬃcient
estimate for I/N says that preferences for banknote holdings between immi-
grants and natives are similar. Alternatively, when δ is positive this says that
immigrants in Switzerland have strong preferences to hold large banknotes.
Such behavior is consistent with remittances or a lack of ﬁnancial partici-
pation. Alternatively, when δ is negative, this says that possible immigrant
traits such as age, education, or income are captured through I/N.
Although equation (1) is not subject to the endogeneity conundrum be-
tween supply and demand (banknote orders are demand driven), other esti-
mation issues need to be addressed. First, omitted variables, such as prices
or income unavailable at the municipality level, inﬂuence an immigrant’s de-
cision to reside in a particular Swiss city and are certainly correlated with
banknote orders. The omitted variables problem biases the estimates of δ in
(1). In the case of rising income, this leads to an upward biased estimate of
δ.
Second, potential measurement problems of the immigrant stock raise
concerns of attenuation bias for the estimate of δ (see Aydemir and Borjas,
2006). Immigration is measured as the number of foreign nationals residing
in Switzerland. Because the immigration stock varies in response to natu-14
ralized citizens and births of foreign nationals, our measure of immigration
is contaminated. This measurement problem drives the OLS estimate of δ
towards zero. Although at the national level the diﬀerence between foreign
nationals and foreign born population is small by international comparisons,
it is diﬃcult to determine how large the measurement problem is across re-
gions.11
I resolve both problems of omitted variables and of measurement error
by instrumenting for Imt/Nmt. The instrumental variable is based on settle-
ment patterns of previous immigrants. Following Card (2001), I construct
a variable that predicts immigrant ﬂows for each municipality and for each
quarter.12 The intuition is to exploit the location choices of past immigrants
from each area of origin to predict settlement decisions of immigrants from
the same country. The instrument variable predicts the immigrant stock
ﬁltering local contemporary demand factors.
The instrument’s construction involves several steps. In a ﬁrst step, immi-
11Swiss record keeping of immigrants follows the “ius sanguinis” concept. In 2006,
foreign nationals were 20.2% of the population, while foreign born were 22.9% of the
population. See Table 3 in M¨ unz (2008) for European comparisons.
12Cortes (2008), Frattini (2009), Lach (2007), and Saiz (2007) use the same instrument
strategy in a similar speciﬁcation to equation (1).15
grants are divided into 11 countries of origin. I then calculate Iit, the number
of immigrants from each country, i, that reside in Switzerland in quarter t.13
Next, the fraction of immigrants from country, i, in municipality, m, is the
quarterly average for the year 2004, ¯ λmi = ¯ Imi/¯ Ii. The predicted number
of immigrants from country i in quarter t is ¯ λmiIit. By summing over i,
a measure of the predicted total immigrant inﬂow into municipality, m,a t
time, t, is obtained that is free of local shocks. A ﬁnal step normalizes the








The regression of the immigrant-to-native ratio on the supply push in-
strument, SPmt, oﬀers a simple test of an instrument’s strength. Table 2
presents OLS regressions from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4 with municipality eﬀects.
In each regression, the instrument has a t-value above 5, suggesting that SP
passes the critic of weak instruments. The ﬁrst regression in column 1 is un-
restricted. It includes information on immigrants from 2675 municipalities.
Next in column 2, the sample is restricted to 243 municipalities receiving
13The European countries of origin are Austria, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Serbia, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, Turkey, United Kingdom, and others.16
banknote orders for CHF 1,000 notes in 2006 and 2007. Column 3 shows
the restricted ﬁrst-stage regression of column 2 with time eﬀects. The last
speciﬁcation in column 4, which is used in the analysis in section 4, includes
ln(population) and the unemployed-to-population ratio in the speciﬁcation
of column (3).
3.2 The data
The quarterly sample from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4 covers a maximum of 251
municipalities. Data on banknote orders at the bank-branch level are aggre-
gated to the municipality level. The quarterly data are from UBS, the largest
national distributor of banknotes in Switzerland.14 Banknote orders across
municipalities should be treated as homogenous in that UBS note distributors
have monopoly power at the local level and operate with equal delivery times
(i.e., two and half hours or less) for the served municipalities. UBS handles
roughly one-third of the banknote distribution activity in Switzerland.
The broad coverage of banknote orders is ﬁrst shown graphically followed
by statistical information that conﬁrms this result. UBS’s distribution is
14Most distributors operate only regionally. The distribution of banknotes is fully priva-
tized in Switzerland. Information on the location of notes returned to the Swiss National
Bank is unavailable.17
shown in Figure 2. The darker shaded dots denote the banks served by UBS
and the lighter shaded dots depict the remaining municipalities in Switzer-
land. The sparse areas in Figure 2 are consistent with Switzerland’s mountain
regions.
Table 3 provides statistical information on banknote orders that conﬁrms
the broad-based coverage.15 The ﬁrst column shows the number of municipal-
ities served. They range between 199 and 251, depending on the banknote’s
size. Column 2 shows the percentage of German speaking municipalities
served. Apart from the CHF 50 note, the currency percentages lie close to the
national average of 72% for the German-speaking population. Next, columns
3 to 6 provide information on the average, the minimum and the maximum,
and the standard deviation of the quarterly total of the distributed currency.
In the last column, the quarterly average from column 3 is divided by the
average quarterly outstanding currency for the respective banknote. Except
for the CHF 10 and the CHF 200 banknote, the percentages lie between 10%
and 15%. The low percentage for the CHF 10 note (0.005%) suggests that
UBS coverage is problematic for the smallest banknote, whereas the distri-
15The appendix oﬀers further additional descriptive information at the municipality
level. It shows that smaller municipalities are subject to large outliers.18
bution of the CHF 200 note (46%) may be over-representative with respect
to the others. Because of the broader coverage of the CHF 200 note, this
banknote is included in the empirical analysis as a control for the regression
estimates for the CHF 1,000 notes.
The postal code from the banknote orders is matched with other data
sources. From the Federal Oﬃce for Migration, I obtained data on the num-
ber of foreigners grouped by their origin for each municipality in Switzerland.
The data are available at the quarterly frequency. The quarterly variable on
overnight hotel stays by foreigners, which seeks to capture a tourism eﬀect,
is from the Federal Oﬃce of Statistics. Further, the number of unemployed
workers for each community is from the State Secretariat for Economic Af-
fairs. The monthly data are averaged at the quarterly frequency. In addition,
I obtained data on the total resident population for each municipality from
the Federal Oﬃce of Statistics. The population data, available only at the
annual frequency, are disaggregated by a linear interpolation over a 20-year
period from 1989 to 2008.
4. Empirical results
This section presents the empirical results that the immigrant-to-native ratio19
captures wealth and age eﬀects entering a precautionary demand function.
In the ﬁrst subsection, the main result for large banknotes is documented:
the correlation between banknote orders and the immigrant-to-native ratio is
negative.16 The second subsection presents robustness tests that control for
income eﬀects by excluding geographical areas where poorer natives reside
(i.e., mountainous and rural areas). These results show that the hoarding
eﬀect is linked to wealthier natives. The third subsection presents empirical
results that examine the seasonal pattern of equation (1). The empirical
ﬁndings are inconsistent with the tax evasion argument.
4.1 The main results
Table 4 presents OLS and IV regression estimates for CHF 200 and CHF
1,000 banknote orders. All regressions are for the full sample and control for
municipality eﬀects. The coeﬃcient estimates for the immigrant-to-native
ratio and population are sensitive to estimation type and the introduction of
time eﬀects. In the OLS and IV regressions, the introduction of time eﬀects
lowers the coeﬃcient estimates for the immigrant-to-native ratio. This result
says that macroeconomic trends, such as interest rates, interact strongly with
16Table Appendix A shows that this negative relationship for municipalities with the 10
highest and 10 lowest immigrant to native ratios.20
the immigrant-to-native ratio. Further, the introduction of the unemployed-
to-population ratio is positive reﬂecting the view that immigrant unemploy-
ment is highly concentrated in larger cities. This variable, however, does not
inﬂuence the coeﬃcient estimates for the immigrant-to-native ratio.
OLS estimates ﬁnd that the immigrant-to-native ratio is insigniﬁcant.
These estimates are presented in the top panel of Table 4. The immigrant-
to-native ratios are insigniﬁcant in all regressions for the CHF 200 banknotes.
The introduction of municipality size (natural log population), economic ac-
tivity (unemployed-to-population ratio), natural log of overnight hotel stays,
or time eﬀects does not change the result that the demand for 200 banknotes
does not diﬀer between immigrants and natives. In each of these regres-
sions, the variable of interest is insigniﬁcant and the size eﬀects captured by
population have the wrong sign.
A somewhat similar picture emerges for the OLS estimates for the CHF
1,000 notes. The immigrant-to-native ratio is positive and signiﬁcant in
the regression without time eﬀects, see columns 6 and 7 versus column 8.
The introduction of time dummies reduces the coeﬃcient estimate of the
immigrant-to-native ratio fourfold and eliminates its signiﬁcance, see columns
8 to 10. The introduction of population, the unemployed-to-population ratio,21
or overnight stays has no signiﬁcant bearing on the results for the immigrant-
to-native ratio.
Next, IV estimates reveal that immigrant municipalities hoard fewer
larger banknotes. The bottom panel of Table 4 shows IV estimates of diﬀerent
speciﬁcations of equation (1). The F-tests from the ﬁrst-stage regression are
all high, suggesting that the critic of weak instruments does not apply. The
coeﬃcient estimates for the immigrant-to-native ratio are negative and sig-
niﬁcant at the 1% critical level in the regression for the CHF 200 banknotes.
The coeﬃcient size for I/N jumps from -10 to -20 with the introduction of
time eﬀects. In other words, a 1% increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio
leads to a reduction by CHF 4,000. This result is partially compensated by
population size by CHF 1,000 (i.e., it has a coeﬃcient size of 5).17 These
results are not sensitive to the introduction of the unemployed-to-population
ratio. This latter variable enters with a positive coeﬃcient and is signiﬁcant
at the 5% level. The introduction of the overnight stays in column 5 is signif-
icant and mitigates the population eﬀect without inﬂuencing the coeﬃcient
17This estimate needs to be treated with caution in that population is not necessarily
exogenous in this speciﬁcation, see Lach (2007). The results are not sensitive to whether
N or (I + N) is used to control for size eﬀects.22
on the immigrant-to-native ratio.
The IV estimates for CHF 1,000 banknotes resemble those for CHF 200
banknotes. The coeﬃcient estimates for I/N fall from 7.7 to -7.7 with the
introduction of time eﬀects, see columns 6 and 7. The coeﬃcient estimates
of I/N are negative and signiﬁcant at the 10% level in regressions with time
eﬀects, see columns 8 to 10. The regressions with time eﬀects show that a 1%
increase in the immigrant-to-native ratio leads to a CHF 7,000 reduction in
the demand for large banknotes. This result is compensated by population
size in the order of CHF 3,000. As for the CHF 200 note, hotel stays in
column 10 captures size eﬀects rather than separate tourist eﬀects. Thus, the
preferred speciﬁcations in Table 4 are columns 4 and 9. These regressions are
estimated with greater degrees of freedom and show positive and signiﬁcant
size eﬀects for population.
Next, I examine whether the disproportionate eﬀect between immigrants
and natives for large banknotes holds for other banknote denominations. A
signiﬁcant negative result across all banknote denominations is consistent
with the traditional and not the precautionary demand for money. The IV
regressions in Table 5 are based on speciﬁcations 4 and 9 in Table 4. Only
the coeﬃcient estimates for the immigrant-to-native ratio are shown.23
The empirical results for various banknotes show that the immigrant de-
mand for smaller banknotes is not distinct from natives, except for the CHF
20 notes. The coeﬃcient estimates are insigniﬁcant for the CHF 10, the
CHF 50, and the CHF 100 banknote, whereas for the CHF 20 note it is neg-
ative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. These results are consistent with the
precautionary demand speciﬁcation and the view that natives hoard larger
banknotes.
A further consideration is whether the hoarding of large CHF banknotes
by natives is more pronounced with a particular immigrant group linked
to education. If education matters for the adoption of new ﬁnancial tech-
nologies, then the demand for large banknotes by well educated immigrants
should be lower than for less educated immigrants. To test this claim, I
examine the behavior of the four largest immigrant groups in Switzerland:
Germans, Italians, Serbians, and Portuguese. A striking feature is that these
nationals have diﬀerent levels of education. German immigrants have the
highest percentage of university degrees (64% in 2007, see Table 1), while
the Portuguese the lowest (6% in 2007). The IV regressions in Table 6 again
show only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio for speciﬁcations
4 and 9 in Table 4 for the CHF 200 and CHF 1,000 banknotes. The in-24
struments have been adjusted so that only the ﬁxed immigrant share at the
municipality level in 2004 is multiplied by the aggregate of the respective
immigrant group.18
The IV regressions for immigrant groups show that the coeﬃcients are
all negative except for Serbian immigrants in the demand speciﬁcation for
CHF 1,000 notes. The negative and signiﬁcant results for the more educated
immigrants (i.e., Germans with CHF 200 notes and Italians with CHF 1,000
notes) is consistent with the micro evidence in Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(1996) that ﬁnd education to be negatively correlated with money demand.
Because the signiﬁcance for the higher educated immigrants is not uniform
across the large banknotes, the evidence that the immigrant-to native ratio
is capturing demographic eﬀects related to education must be interpreted as
weak.
4.2 Controlling for municipality and regional characteristics
This subsection presents robustness checks for the result that natives hoard
large banknotes. The robustness checks control for income and non linear
eﬀects with sample splits for municipality and regional characteristics. The
18Data for Swiss education levels at the local level is not available for the observed
sample.25
evidence shows that these factors are non neutral, however the main result
that natives hoard more than immigrants holds.
The ﬁrst set of regressions presents coeﬃcient estimates for I/N that
control for municipality characteristics linked to wealth. Panel A of Table
7 divides the sample based on a municipality population below or above
10,000 residents for the CHF 200 and CHF 1,000 note.19 The conjecture is
that larger municipalities are wealthier and thus the immigrant eﬀect should
be stronger with the CHF 1,000 note than with the CHF 200 note.
Indeed, this is what the results based on population size show. The results
show strong evidence of native hoarding for CHF 200 notes in smaller mu-
nicipalities. The opposite result holds for the largest banknote in the larger
municipalities. The immigrant-to-native ratio is negative and signiﬁcant at
the 10% level for large municipalities. This hoarding result is consistent with
the fact that incomes are higher in larger municipalities.
The role of special tax reductions is examined next. To do so, the sample
is divided between municipalities that are exempt from special taxes because
of their weak ﬁscal position. The estimates are recorded in panel B of Table
19Table A1 in the appendix shows that banknote orders for smaller municipalities are
subject to large outliers.26
7. The coeﬃcient estimates for I/N show that municipalities not beneﬁt-
ting from the tax reduction, hoarding prevails. These coeﬃcient estimates
are close to the full sample estimates recorded in Table 4, but their level of
signiﬁcance is higher. The insigniﬁcant estimates for the sample of munici-
palities enjoying tax beneﬁts, however, must be interpreted with care. The
sample size is small and the F-test values from the ﬁrst-stage regressions are
low.
The next robustness test considers the inﬂuence of regional location on
the distribution of CHF 200 and CHF 1,000 banknote orders. Table 8 splits
the sample at the municipality level in two ways: rural versus urban ar-
eas and mountain versus low-land regions. The sample splits are motivated
by location of commercial activity: agriculture sector (rural) and tourism
(mountain region). The agriculture (8.1% immigrant labor participation in
2006) and tourist (51%) sector control for income eﬀects and contrasting
immigrant participation rates in the labor force.
Again, the results from the sample split on rural versus non rural areas
reconﬁrm the conjecture that wealthier natives are driving the demand for
large banknotes. Panel A of Table 8 shows regression results for rural and non
rural areas. This sample split controls for higher-income eﬀects and higher27
labor participation eﬀects on the part of immigrants in non rural areas. Only
for the non rural areas is a negative and signiﬁcant result found. The result
for the rural areas instead has to be interpreted with caution because of the
low F-test values from the ﬁrst-stage regressions.
Further tests based on elevation reveal that the wealthier low land re-
gions generate the strongest negative correlation with immigrant municipal-
ities. Panel B of Table 8 shows regression results for high and low elevation
municipalities (i.e., 800 meters or more). Only for the low municipalities is
a negative and signiﬁcant result for I/N observed. The estimates for the
immigrant-to-native ratio are insigniﬁcant for mountain municipalities. The
insigniﬁcance result is consistent with the fact that incomes of municipalities
in the mountain areas lie well below the national average.
4.3 Seasonal patterns and tax evasion
The empirical results in the previous section show that a higher level of na-
tive wealth is associated with a negative correlation between large banknotes
and the immigrant-to-native ratio. This negative correlation is inconsistent
with the unbanked and the remittance hypotheses. However, an open issue
remains whether the negative coeﬃcient for the immigrant-to-native ratio
captures tax evasion or wealth eﬀects in a precautionary demand function.28
A simple test for tax evasion examines seasonal patterns between ban-
knote orders and immigration ﬂows. This seasonal pattern is deﬁned by a
strong rise in the demand for banknotes in the fourth quarter in year t fol-
lowed by a sudden fall in the demand for banknotes in the ﬁrst quarter in
year t + 1. The rationale for this seasonal pattern is that higher banknote
holdings in the fourth quarter lead to a lower end-of-year balance on ﬁnancial
statements used for tax declarations. In contrast, reduced banknote holdings
in the ﬁrst quarter next year compensate the forgone loss on interest income.
The quarterly regression results do not uncover a seasonal pattern consis-
tent with tax evasion. Table 9 reruns the IV regressions of Table 4 of columns
4 and 9 for individual quarters. Because of the low degrees of freedom, the
results need to be treated with caution. Despite this shortcoming, the quar-
terly estimates for the CHF 200 and the CHF 1,000 notes are signiﬁcant at
the 10% level only for the fourth quarter. Furthermore, the strength of the
ﬁrst-stage regressions is reasonable only for the fourth quarter. The absence
of a signiﬁcant seasonal pattern in the fourth and the ﬁrst quarter suggests
that banknote orders are not driven by tax evasion considerations. Rather,
I interpret the negative correlation between banknote orders and immigrant
cities in Tables 4 and 5 to be driven by immigrant traits: a result consistent29
with the precautionary demand hypothesis.
5. Conclusions
This paper is the ﬁrst country study to examine immigration’s eﬀect on ban-
knote circulation. The empirical results show that immigrant municipalities
have a lower demand for large banknotes. In other words, immigration re-
duces seigniorage per person as measured by banknote orders. Controlling
for population size, a 1% increase in the native-to-population ratio lowers the
demand for the CHF 1,000 banknote by CHF 4,000. A similar immigrant
eﬀect is found for the CHF 200 note, while for the smaller denominated notes
no eﬀect is identiﬁed. Consistent with the hypothesis of the precautionary
demand for money, I attribute this immigrant eﬀect for large banknotes to
speciﬁc immigrant traits such as lower average age and lower average income.30
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
District Immigrant to 
Population 
Ratio
Population  Change in Immigrants 
over Population
(I / Pop) 2007Q4 Pop 2007Q4  ((I 2007Q4 - I 2006Q1)/ 
Pop 2006Q1)x100
CHF 1000 CHF 200 CHF 100 CHF 50 CHF 20 CHF 10
Largest immigrant-municipalities
Renens (VD) 0.50 18904 -1.88 13.58 2.90 . . -17.19 .
Vernier 0.43 31105 -0.80 -3.54 -48.45 -1.68 -74.19 -42.00 .
Rorschach 0.40 8646 1.46 62.57 -8.50 0.00 -2.86 -13.83 138.63
Ecublens (VD) 0.40 10677 0.15 . -9.17 -1.47 . 26.16 .
Vevey 0.40 17381 -0.13 27.25 5.34 14.78 94.45 32.99 .
St. Margrethen 0.39 5351 1.41 32.34 -17.85 -1.39 13.76 42.90 41.99
Rolle 0.38 4950 -1.70 3.70 2.30 8.27 -40.55 38.70 179.18
Biasca 0.38 5919 -1.16 15.42 -9.70 -17.64 8.31 -2.99 .
Genève 0.36 183654 -0.78 12.53 12.49 7.37 50.16 23.22 -25.45
Carouge (GE) 0.35 19336 -1.98 -11.78 45.50 -55.56 109.54 -12.10 .
Average 0.40 30'592 -0.54 16.90 -2.51 -5.26 19.83 7.59 83.58
Smallest immigrant-municipalities
Freimettigen 0.05 362 -2.16 14.11 -10.13 31.02 69.31 24.85 .
Bolligen 0.05 6021 0.45 -26.76 16.58 -6.45 . 0.00 91.63
Koppigen 0.05 2142 0.09 6.62 -2.41 37.68 . 46.86 .
Schüpfen 0.05 3306 1.13 -2.67 12.78 -70.19 . 100.02 .
Hasle bei Burgdorf 0.05 2970 -0.48 10.98 3.97 2.78 . 66.50 .
Mötschwil 0.04 133 10.95 -7.41 -5.05 19.88 46.43 32.90 .
Grächen 0.04 1357 0.60 24.29 -77.87 58.78 . -55.96 .
Deisswil bei Münchenbuchsee 0.02 99 0.00 53.71 -2.15 51.08 . 27.03 .
Ursenbach 0.02 909 0.77 . . 25.13 . 36.29 .
Aeschlen 0.02 311 0.00 11.28 -5.22 25.57 0.00 31.75 -69.31
Average 0.04 1'761 1.13 9.35 -7.72 17.53 38.58 31.02 11.16
Relative Change in Banknote Orders       
((Banknote Orders2007Q4 - Banknote Orders2006Q1)/Banknote  Orders2006Q1)x100
Table A: Descriptive Statistics
Notes: Table A shows the municipalities with the 10 largest and 10 smallest immigrant-to-population  ratios (in 2007Q4).  The changes in immigration  and banknote orders display the 
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Figure 2:36
Table1:EducationofSwissandImmigrants(thousands)
2006 2007 2006 2007
High School Certificate  680 675 0.168 0.164
Swiss 410 408 0.128 0.128
Immigrants 270 267 0.318 0.305
Germany 3 3 0.031 0.023
France 3 4 0.067 0.082
Italy 54 52 0.332 0.318
Spain and Greece 18 15 0.337 0.309
Portugal 70 73 0.676 0.661
Serbia 71 70 0.445 0.431
Appenticeship 2198 2204 0.543 0.535
Swiss 1852 1850 0.579 0.570
Immigrants 346 354 0.407 0.404
Germany 36 38 0.348 0.333
France 16 16 0.381 0.357
Italy 83 84 0.510 0.518
Spain and Greece 25 23 0.479 0.467
Portugal 28 31 0.273 0.281
Serbia 79 82 0.494 0.507
University Degree 1173 1243 0.290 0.302
Swiss 939 988 0.293 0.304
Immigrants 234 255 0.275 0.291
Germany 64 74 0.622 0.644
France 23 25 0.553 0.561
Italy 26 26 0.158 0.163
Spain and Greece 10 11 0.184 0.224
Portugal 5 6 0.051 0.058
Serbia 10 10 0.060 0.062
Total 4051 4122 1.000 1.000
Swiss 3201 3246 1.000 1.000
Immigrants 850 876 1.000 1.000
Germany 103 115 1.000 1.000
France 43 45 1.000 1.000
Italy 163 162 1.000 1.000
Spain and Greece 52 50 1.000 1.000
Portugal 103 110 1.000 1.000
Serbia 159 161 1.000 1.000
Notes: source Swiss Federal Statistics Office. Sake Survey
3537
Table 2: Immigrant-to-Native Ratio and the Instrument SP
(1) (2) (3) (4)
restricted restricted restricted
unrestricted CHF 1,000 only  CHF 1,000 only  CHF 1,000 only 
OLS Estimation     
SP 1.690*** 1.730*** 1.931*** 2.028***
(0.310) (0.1760) (0.424) (0.400)
ln population no no no yes
unemployment/population no no no yes
time effects no no yes yes
Number of observations 20414 1859 1859 1859
Number of cities 2675 243 243 243
Notes: Estimation is OLS with fixed (city) effects. SP is the instrument. Sample is from 2006:Q1 to
 2007:Q4.  *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.38

Table 3: Statistics on UBS Banknote Orders
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
  German speaking average ave note order.to
total cities cities  only  per quarter min max St. Dev.  ave outstanding
CHF 10 199 0.754 3.0 2.3 3.8 0.6 0.005
CHF 20 249 0.715 194 169 213 14.7 0.148
CHF 50 173 0.867 188 150 229 26.7 0.106
CHF 100 242 0.736 948 835 1280 149.0 0.125
CHF 200 251 0.708 2760 2560 3110 178.0 0.461
CHF 1,000 244 0.713 2220 1870 2840 392.0 0.102
Notes: Total cities are number of cities covered by UBS banknote orders. German speaking cities is the percentage of German speaking 
cities to total cities served by UBS. Ave. per quarter denotes the average banknote volume for a particular banknote in millions. 
min and max are with respect to the quarterly volume from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. st. dev. is the standard deviation in millions.
ave cur order to ave outstanding is the average quarterly volume of banknote orders to the quarterly average of notes in circulation.39

Table 4: Immigrant-to-Native Ratio and Large Banknotes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
CHF banknotes 200 200 200 200 200 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000
OLS Estimation         
Immigrant/Natives -0.042 0.500 -0.421 -0.472 -0.347 3.523*** 2.727*** 0.753 0.725 1.054
(0.950) (0.983) (0.909) (0.910) (1.323) (0.213) (0.791) (0.622) (0.603) (0.909)
 
ln population -2.099*** -0.321 -0.281 -0.757 3.058** 0.473 0.495 -0.197
(0.784) (0.800) (0.802) (1.697) (1.077) (1.048) (1.046) (1.167)
unemployment/population  4.839* 8.318** 3.382 6.256***
 (2.584) (3.499) (2.366) (2.424)
ln hotel overnight stays 0.021** 0.023***
(0.009) (0.006)
time effects no no yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
 
Number of observations 1927 1927 1927 1927 1724 1876 1876 1876 1876 1712
Number of cities 250 250 250 250 225 244 244 244 244 226
R-square (within) 0.000 0.002 0.052 0.054 0.53 0.009 0.015 0.361 0.361 0.378
IV Estimation
Immigrant/Natives -9.790*** -10.845** -21.047*** -20.586*** -20.771*** 9.206*** 7.741** -7.703* -7.416* -7.041*
(3.412) (4.411) (6.313) (6.241) (6.972) (2.928) (3.746) (4.129) (4.091) (4.111)
 
ln population 1.188 5.192** 5.106** 1.414 1.651 2.753* 2.693* 0.311
(1.716) (2.202) (2.185) (1.995) (1.465) (4.129) (1.464) (1.293)
unemployment/population  6.586** 7.213* 3.913* 4.628*
 (3.315) (3.694) (2.314) (2.415)
ln hotel overnight stays 0.037 0.165***
(0.064) (0.042)
time effects no no yes yes yes no no yes yes yes
 
Number of observations 1911 1911 1911 1911 1707 1859 1859 1859 1859 1683
Number of cities 249 249 249 249 226 243 243 243 243 223
R-square (first stage within) 0.100 0.135 0.157 0.158 0.152 0.100 0.137 0.159 0.160 0.152
  
F-test (first stage regression) 184.3 129.95 34.24 31.10 23.79 181.04 127.83 33.81 30.65 23.78
Notes: Estimation is OLS or IV with fixed (city) effects. Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4.
 *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.40

Table 5: Immigrant-to-Native Ratio on Banknote Orders of Different Denomination
CHF banknotes 10 20 50 100 200 1,000
Immigrant/Natives -11.465 -21.938** 7.476 -11.936 -20.568*** -7.416*
(14.095) (8.715) (11.831) (7.753) (6.241) (4.091)
Number of observations 896 1764 1497 1884 1991 1859
Number of cities 198 248 241 250 249 243
R-square 0.158 0.056 0.126 0.110 0.063 0.120
F-test (first stage regression) 21.64 29.25 23.01 31.24 31.10 30.65
Notes: Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.41

Table 6:   Ethnic Cities and Large Banknote Orders
CHF 200 banknote        
Immigrant group Germans Italians Serbians Portuguese
Immigrant/Natives -19.277*** -69.889 -593.963 -8.516
(5.592) (63.580) (848.131) (22.308)
Number of observations 1911 1911 1911 1911
Number of cities 249 249 249 249
R-square (first stage within) 0.576 0.142 0.112 0.123
F-test (first stage regression) 224.79 27.31 20.84 23.06
CHF 1,000 banknote        
immigrant group Germans Italians Serbians Portuguese
Immigrant/Natives -0.864 -80.994* 1.020 -6.368
(3.944) (47.887) (161.464) (15.985)
Number of observations 1859 1859 1859 1859
Number of cities 243 243 243 243
R-square (first stage within) 0.582 0.144 0.115 0.125
F-test (first stage regression) 223.33 27.10 20.84 22.94
Notes: Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.42

Table 7: City Characteristics, Immigrant-to-Native Ratio, and Banknote Orders
CHF Banknotes 200 200 1,000 1,000
A: City population < 10000 yes no yes no
Immigrant/Natives -22.799** -11.592 -5.454 -9.052*
(8.965) (8.375) (6.459) (4.796)
Number of observations 1096 815 1060 799
Number of cities 143 107 139 105
R-square (first stage within) 0.144 0.224 0.143 0.234
F-test (first stage regression) 15.79 20.10 15.21 20.91
B. Special Tax Treatment yes no yes no
Immigrant/Natives -132.339 -18.146*** 91.544 -10.533***
(363.628) (6.302) (126.117) (3.970)
Number of observations 343 1569 333 1526
Number of cities 43 206 42 201
R-square (first stage within) 0.050 0.186 0.046 0.188
F-test (first stage regression) 1.50 30.94 1.34 30.44
Notes: Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.43

Table 8: Geographical Characteristics, Immigrant-to-Native Ratio, and Banknote Orders
CHF Banknotes 200 200 1,000 1,000
      
A: Rural area yes no yes no
Immigrant/Native -63.301 -15.416** 12.297 -10.075***
(68.018) (6.239) (20.009) (3.881)
Number of observations 608 1303 595 1264
Number of cities 79 170 77 166
R-square (first-stage within) 0.128 0.211 0.129 0.211
F-test (first stage regression) 7.64 30.04 7.50 29.13
B: Alp - mountain area yes no yes no
Immigrant/Native -10.658 -20.098*** 4.961 -11.760**
(7.338) (7.814) (6.638) (4.762)
Number of observations 762 1149 760 1099
Number of cities 98 151 98 145
R-square (first-stage within) 0.220 0.169 0.222 0.174
F-test (first stage regression) 18.46 20.09 18.57 19.85
Notes: Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses.44

Table 9: Seasonal Characteristics, Immigrant-to-Native Ratio, and Banknote Orders
CHF 200 Banknotes Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Immigrant/Native -7.836 -52.52* -200.791 -12.734*
(9.856) (30.052) (807.577) (7.219)
Number of observations 486 476 475 474
Number of cities 246 246 249 247
R-square (first stage within) 0.093 0.078 0.225 0.392
F-test (first stage regression) 6.01 4.80 16.10 35.72
CHF 1,000 Banknotes Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4
Immigrant/Native -4.740 -7.527 48.306 -9.425*
(6.021) (11.351) (132.139) (5.610)
Number of observations 471 463 461 464
Number of cities 241 241 240 242
R-square (first stage within) 0.118 0.074 0.211 0.393
F-test (first stage regression) 7.54 4.34 14.67 35.28
Notes: Only the estimates of the immigrant-to-native ratio from an IV regression with fixed effects at the 
city time level (that includes ln population, unemployment/ population, and time effects) are shown.
F-Test(10, Observations-cities-10) is from the first stage regression that includes the instrument  
(see equation 2). Sample is from 2006:Q1 to 2007:Q4. *,**, *** denotes significance at the 10%, 5%, 
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